A Report on the Flawed Proposals for Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in TTIP and CETA

35 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2015 Last revised: 19 Jun 2015

Gus Van Harten

York University - Osgoode Hall Law School

Date Written: April 10, 2015

Abstract

This discussion paper elaborates on five serious flaws with proposals for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS) in proposed Europe-United States and Europe-Canada trade deals known by the acronyms TTIP and CETA. The issues elaborated in the paper are: the unjustified replacement of judges with arbitrators, the lack of institutional safeguards of independence and fairness in ISDS, the privileging of foreign investors over other actors, the risk to European standards of regulation, and the fact that TTIP (and to a lesser extent CETA) would expand the scope of ISDS massively. The paper is written from a European perspective, considering that most European countries and the European Union have not agreed to ISDS in any past treaty with the U.S. or Canada and thus would assume much-expanded risks and constraints associated with ISDS due to TTIP or CETA.

Keywords: investment, arbitration, ISDS, TTIP, CETA

Suggested Citation

Van Harten, Gus, A Report on the Flawed Proposals for Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) in TTIP and CETA (April 10, 2015). Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper No. 16/2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2595189 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2595189

Gus Van Harten (Contact Author)

York University - Osgoode Hall Law School ( email )

4700 Keele Street
Toronto, Ontario M3J 1P3
Canada
416 650 8419 (Phone)

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