Ancient Worries and Modern Fears: Different Roots and Common Effects of U.S. and EU Privacy Regulation

35 Pages Posted: 21 Apr 2015 Last revised: 21 Sep 2017

See all articles by Pierluigi Perri

Pierluigi Perri

University of Milan - Faculty of Law; Information Society Project - Yale Law School

David Thaw

University of Pittsburgh - School of Law; University of Pittsburgh - School of Information Sciences; Yale University - Information Society Project; University of Pittsburgh - Graduate School of Public & International Affairs; National Defense University - College of Information and Cyberspace

Date Written: September 20, 2017

Abstract

Much legal and technical scholarship discusses the differing views of the United States and European Union toward privacy concepts and regulation. A substantial amount of effort in recent years, in both research and policy, focuses on attempting to reconcile these viewpoints searching for a common framework with a common level of protection for citizens from both sides of Atlantic. Reconciliation, we argue, misunderstands the nature of the challenge facing effective cross-border data flows. No such reconciliation can occur without abdication of some sovereign authority of nations, that would require the adoption of an international agreement with typical tools of international law. In this Article, we explore an alternative means to achieve effective data interchange governance among the Western nations, arguing that the focus for addressing privacy issues created in cross-border data flows should instead be procedural, rather than substantive.

Beginning with the observation that both U.S. and EU cultures share a common fear of “chilling effects” infringing various rights to privacy, we link the differences in privacy fears to the comparative views of the role of the state. These differences are instructive in that while they limit the potential for substantive harmonization of privacy goals, they also create substantial opportunity for procedural harmonization.

Such procedural harmonization would afford many benefits, reducing transaction costs for multi-national organizations and increasing the probability that individuals can express (and rely upon implementation) of their privacy preferences. The result is a system we describe as Market-Supervised Regulatory Delegation, in which the substantive differences among nations can be respected and implemented in an international market for expressing privacy preferences which is not distorted by the overhead of competing compliance regimes.

Keywords: jurisdiction, privacy, chilling effects, surveillance, compliance, cross-jurisdictional privacy management, data protection reform, framework

Suggested Citation

Perri, Pierluigi and Thaw, David, Ancient Worries and Modern Fears: Different Roots and Common Effects of U.S. and EU Privacy Regulation (September 20, 2017). Connecticut Law Review, Forthcoming, U. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2016-06, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2596382. or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2596382

Pierluigi Perri

University of Milan - Faculty of Law ( email )

Via Festa del Perdono, 7
20122 Milano
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.pierluigiperri.it

Information Society Project - Yale Law School ( email )

127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06511
United States
2036001305 (Phone)

David Thaw (Contact Author)

University of Pittsburgh - School of Law ( email )

3900 Forbes Ave.
Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.davidthaw.com

University of Pittsburgh - School of Information Sciences ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15260
United States

Yale University - Information Society Project ( email )

P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States

University of Pittsburgh - Graduate School of Public & International Affairs ( email )

Pittsburgh, PA 15260-0001
United States

National Defense University - College of Information and Cyberspace ( email )

300 5th Ave
Ft McNair
Washington, DC 20319
United States

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