The European Banking Union - Rationale and Key Policy Issues

Ch. 1, in: Jens-Hinrich Binder and Christos V. Gortsos (eds.), Banking Union: A Compendium, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015, Forthcoming

20 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2015

See all articles by Jens-Hinrich Binder

Jens-Hinrich Binder

Eberhard-Karls-University - Faculty of Law; EUSFIL Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence; European Banking Institute; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: April 22, 2015

Abstract

The creation of the European Banking Union has substantially changed the supervisory infrastructure in the participating EU Member States. The underlying rationale is complex and, in part, contradictory. Against this backdrop, present paper critically reviews the policy debate both prior to and after the completion of the relevant legal foundations, discusses the policy issues and technical implications, and presents a preliminary assessment of the final arrangements against stated (and hidden) policy objectives.

Keywords: Banking Union, Single Supervisory Mechanism, Single Resolution Mechanism

JEL Classification: E44, G20, G21

Suggested Citation

Binder, Jens-Hinrich, The European Banking Union - Rationale and Key Policy Issues (April 22, 2015). Ch. 1, in: Jens-Hinrich Binder and Christos V. Gortsos (eds.), Banking Union: A Compendium, Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2015, Forthcoming , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2597676

Jens-Hinrich Binder (Contact Author)

Eberhard-Karls-University - Faculty of Law ( email )

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Germany
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HOME PAGE: http://www.jura.uni-tuebingen.de/professoren_und_dozenten/binder

EUSFIL Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence ( email )

Italy

European Banking Institute ( email )

Frankfurt
Germany

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
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1000 Brussels
Belgium

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