Gender Differences in Motivational Crowding Out of Work Performance

32 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2015 Last revised: 7 Oct 2018

See all articles by Volker Benndorf

Volker Benndorf

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE)

Holger Andreas Rau

University of Goettingen (Gottingen)

Christian Sölch

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg-Friedrich Alexander Universität Erlangen Nürnberg

Date Written: July 2018

Abstract

This paper shows that prior financial incentives induce a crowding out effect when incentives are discontinued. In our real-effort experiment workers receive a piece rate before monetary incentives are substituted by a one-time payment. In this case, workers' performance significantly drops when receiving the one-time payment. The effect is driven by a fraction of men who reduce effort substantially, whereas women constantly perform well. We find that this motivational crowding-out effect disappears when men do not have prior experience of a piece rate. In a series of control treatments, we discard several alternative explanations besides from motivational crowding out.

Keywords: Gender Differences, Incentives, Motivational Crowding Out, Real-Effort Task

JEL Classification: C91, J16, M54

Suggested Citation

Benndorf, Volker and Rau, Holger Andreas and Sölch, Christian, Gender Differences in Motivational Crowding Out of Work Performance (July 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2597769 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2597769

Volker Benndorf

Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf - Duesseldorf Institute for Competition Economics (DICE) ( email )

Universitaetsstr. 1
Duesseldorf, NRW 40225
Germany

Holger Andreas Rau (Contact Author)

University of Goettingen (Gottingen) ( email )

Platz der Gottinger Sieben 3
Gottingen, D-37073
Germany

Christian Sölch

University of Erlangen-Nuremberg-Friedrich Alexander Universität Erlangen Nürnberg ( email )

Lange Gasse 20
Nuremberg, Bavaria 90403
Germany

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