Relying on the Information of Interested - and Potentially Dishonest - Parties

UVA Law School, Legal Studies Working Paper No. 00-12

38 Pages Posted: 12 Feb 2001  

Chris William Sanchirico

University of Pennsylvania Law School; University of Pennsylvania Wharton School - Business Economics and Public Policy Department

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: 2001

Abstract

This paper investigates the role of evidence production in the regulation of private behavior via judicial and administrative process. The paper presents a model in which the law makes the agent's fine depend on the presentation of evidence whose production cost, in turn, depends on how the agent has behaved in the regulated activity. The targeted behavior becomes more privately beneficial to the agent to the extent that it reduces the agent's evidence costs and so improves its highest obtainable payoffs (net of costs) at the subsequent hearing. This view of evidence production has several notable implications, including that truth-finding has no direct role in deterrence, that non-falsifiable evidence, even when available, is unlikely to be the best choice for the system, and that "overdeterrence" may well be cost effective.

Suggested Citation

Sanchirico, Chris William, Relying on the Information of Interested - and Potentially Dishonest - Parties (2001). UVA Law School, Legal Studies Working Paper No. 00-12. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=259815 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.259815

Chris William Sanchirico (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-4220 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/faculty/csanchir/

University of Pennsylvania Wharton School - Business Economics and Public Policy Department

3641 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6372
United States

Paper statistics

Downloads
215
Rank
113,212
Abstract Views
2,160