Are the Borrowing Costs of Large Financial Firms Unusual?

FEDS Working Paper No. 2015-024

http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2015.024

66 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2015

See all articles by Javed Ahmed

Javed Ahmed

Metis

Chris Anderson

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Rebecca Zarutskie

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

Date Written: February 20, 2015

Abstract

Estimates of investor expectations of government support of large financial firms are often based on large financial firms' lower borrowing costs relative to smaller financial firms. Using pricing data on credit default swaps (CDS) and corporate bonds over the period 2004 to 2013, however, we find that the CDS and bond spreads of financial firms are no more sensitive to borrower size than the spreads of non-financial firms. Outside of the financial crisis period, spreads are more sensitive to borrower size in several non-financial industries. We find that size-related differences in spreads are partially driven by higher liquidity and recovery rates of larger borrowers. Prior to the financial crisis, we also find that financial firms exhibited generally lower spreads that were less sensitive to size than spreads for several other industries. Our results suggest that estimates of implicit government guarantees to financial firms may overemphasize size-related borrowing cost differentials. However, our analysis also suggests that, prior to the financial crisis, investor expectations of government support, or generally reduced risk perceptions, may have reduced borrowing costs for the financial industry, as a whole.

Keywords: Borrowing costs, Credit default swaps, Financial industry, Implicit government guarantee, Size effect, Too-big-to-fail

JEL Classification: G21, G22, G24, G28

Suggested Citation

Ahmed, Javed and Anderson, Christopher and Zarutskie, Rebecca, Are the Borrowing Costs of Large Financial Firms Unusual? (February 20, 2015). FEDS Working Paper No. 2015-024, http://dx.doi.org/10.17016/FEDS.2015.024, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2598770 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2598770

Javed Ahmed

Metis ( email )

New York, NY
United States
6463378568 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.linkedin.com/in/javediahmed/

Christopher Anderson

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and Constitution Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20551
United States

Rebecca Zarutskie (Contact Author)

Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System ( email )

20th Street and C Streets NW
Mailstop 155-B
Washington, DC 20551
United States
202-452-5292 (Phone)

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