Market Design and Moral Behavior

71 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2015

See all articles by Michael Kirchler

Michael Kirchler

University of Innsbruck

Juergen Huber

University of Innsbruck; University of Vienna - Department of Finance

Matthias Stefan

University of Innsbruck

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Abstract

In an experiment with 739 subjects we study whether and how different interventions might have an influence on the degree of moral behavior when subjects make decisions that can generate negative externalities on uninvolved parties. Particularly, subjects can either take money for themselves or donate it to UNICEF for measles vaccines. By considering two fairly different institutional regimes – one with individual decision making, one with a double-auction market – we expose the different interventions to a kind of robustness check. We find that the threat of monetary punishment promotes moral behavior in both regimes. Getting subjects more involved with the traded good has no effect, though, in both regimes. Only the removal of anonymity, thus making subjects identifiable, has different effects across regimes, which we explain by different perceptions of responsibility.

Keywords: morals, market design, experiment

JEL Classification: C91, C92, D47

Suggested Citation

Kirchler, Michael and Huber, Juergen and Stefan, Matthias and Sutter, Matthias, Market Design and Moral Behavior. IZA Discussion Paper No. 8973. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2598913

Michael Kirchler (Contact Author)

University of Innsbruck ( email )

Universitätsstraße 15
Innsbruck, Innsbruck 6020
Austria

Juergen Huber

University of Innsbruck ( email )

Universitätsstraße 15
Innsbruck, Innsbruck 6020
Austria

University of Vienna - Department of Finance ( email )

Bruenner Strasse 72
Vienna, 1210
Austria

Matthias Stefan

University of Innsbruck ( email )

Universitätsstraße 15
Innsbruck, 6020
Austria

Matthias Sutter

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods ( email )

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

University of Cologne - Department of Economics

Cologne, 50923
Germany

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