Legal Polycentrism, the Circularity Problem, and the Regression Theorem of Institutional Development

Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 17, 4 (2014), 510-8.

9 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2015

Date Written: December 1, 2014

Abstract

The circularity problem states that before legal polycentrists can employ price theoretic arguments about market competition, they must first show that legal polycentrism is able to instantiate the institutional framework within which property rights are protected and contracts are enforced. If these requirements are not satisfied, it is illegitimately circular to draw on market competition as an argument for legal polycentrism. This paper indicates that the above problem can be solved by relying on the regression theorem of institutional development, whereby the development of higher-level (hard) institutions is conditioned by the development of lower-level (soft) institutions.

Keywords: legal polycentrism, institutions, institutional development, spontaneous order, collective action

JEL Classification: P16, P48

Suggested Citation

Wiśniewski, Jakub Bożydar, Legal Polycentrism, the Circularity Problem, and the Regression Theorem of Institutional Development (December 1, 2014). Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 17, 4 (2014), 510-8.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2599286

Jakub Bożydar Wiśniewski (Contact Author)

Independent ( email )

No Address Available

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
24
Abstract Views
266
PlumX Metrics