Compulsory Voting Can Increase Political Inequality: Evidence from Brazil

Posted: 29 Apr 2015

See all articles by Gabriel Cepaluni

Gabriel Cepaluni

São Paulo State University (UNESP)

Fernando D. Hidalgo

University of California, Berkeley

Date Written: April 20, 2015

Abstract

One of the most robust findings in the comparative politics literature is that compulsory voting reduces the participation gap between poorer and wealthier voters. We present evidence that in Brazil, the largest country to use such an institutional rule, compulsory voting increases inequality in turnout. To do so, we use individual-level data from Brazil’s voter registry and two age-based discontinuities embedded in the electoral law, to estimate the heterogeneous effects of compulsory voting by educational achievement, a strong proxy for socioeconomic status. Evidence from both thresholds shows that the causal effect of compulsory voting on turnout among the more educated is at least twice the size of the effect among those with less education. To explain this result, which is the opposite of what is predicted by existing theories, we argue that the non-monetary penalties for abstention primarily affect middle and upper class voters and thus increases their turnout disproportionately. Survey evidence from a national sample provides evidence for the mechanism. Our results show that studies of compulsory voting should consider the presence of non-monetary sanctions, as their effects can reverse standard theoretical predictions.

Keywords: Compulsory voting, voluntary voting, and regression discontinuity design (RDD)

Suggested Citation

Cepaluni, Gabriel and Hidalgo, Fernando D., Compulsory Voting Can Increase Political Inequality: Evidence from Brazil (April 20, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2599859

Gabriel Cepaluni (Contact Author)

São Paulo State University (UNESP) ( email )

Av. Eufrásia Monteiro Petráglia, 900
Jd. Dr. Antonio Petráglia
Franca, Sao Paulo 14409-160
Brazil

Fernando D. Hidalgo

University of California, Berkeley ( email )

310 Barrows Hall
Berkeley, CA 94720
United States

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