IRS, Inc. - The IRS Oversight Board - Effective Reform or Just Politics? Some Early Thoughts from a Corporate Law Perspective

50 Pages Posted: 1 May 2015

Date Written: 2004

Abstract

This article examines the IRS Oversight Board as a governance device, particularly in light of corporate governance in the private sector. The article will first trace the history of the IRS and explore past organizational and governance problems. Focus will then shift to the reforms enacted in the 1998 IRS Restructuring and Reform Act, with particular attention paid to the structural changes and establishment of the IRS Oversight Board. The article will then examine the process of seating the initial board as well as its foray into the 2002 IRS budget battle and the search for the new IRS Commissioner. The article will review the IRS Oversight Board from a corporate perspective by examining the role of directors in governing private corporations.

This article will conclude that the IRS Oversight Board as a governance mechanism does not approach the reform suggested by the political rhetoric and does not significantly improve governance shortcomings. It argues that the corporate board analogy is misplaced. The IRS is not a private corporation. Nor is it a government corporation. Moreover, the characteristics which make a private corporation's board of directors effective are not present. Specifically missing is the plenary power of a corporate board of directors.

This article ultimately concludes that to the extent that the creation of the IRS Oversight Board rests on a corporate analogy, its reform power ends up as ineffective and a failure of tax policy.

Keywords: Corporate scandals, corporate governance, government corporations, IRS Oversight Board, IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, tax policy, taxation

Suggested Citation

Lustig, Eric A., IRS, Inc. - The IRS Oversight Board - Effective Reform or Just Politics? Some Early Thoughts from a Corporate Law Perspective (2004). Duquesne University Law Review, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2004. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2600180

Eric A. Lustig (Contact Author)

New England Law | Boston ( email )

154 Stuart St.
Boston, MA 02116
United States

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