Spontaneous (Non) Emergence of Property Rights

IRIS Center Working Paper No. 241

28 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2001

See all articles by Leonid Polischuk

Leonid Polischuk

University of Maryland - Center on Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS)

Alexei V. Savvateev

New Economic School (NES); Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: January 2001

Abstract

It is often argued that secured property rights are established in response to grassroots demand of private owners. The paper analyzes preferences of private owners over the degree of protection of property rights. The framework for this analysis is an equilibrium model, which combines production and appropriation activities. It is shown that inequality in resource ownership and/or relative inefficiency of production technologies could make wealthier agents to favor less than full protection of property rights. If such agents decide the outcome of public choice of a property rights regime, then fully secured property rights will not emerge from the grassroots. This conclusion is consistent with the failure to establish an efficient system of property rights regime in Russia.

Keywords: Russia, property rights

Suggested Citation

Polischuk, Leonid and Savvateev, Alexei Vladimirovich, Spontaneous (Non) Emergence of Property Rights (January 2001). IRIS Center Working Paper No. 241, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=260036 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.260036

Leonid Polischuk (Contact Author)

University of Maryland - Center on Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (IRIS) ( email )

IRIS Center
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Alexei Vladimirovich Savvateev

New Economic School (NES) ( email )

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Moscow, Skolkovo 143026
Russia

Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology ( email )

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