Voting with Public Information

University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 191, Revised version

52 Pages Posted: 1 May 2015 Last revised: 11 Jul 2018

See all articles by Shuo Liu

Shuo Liu

Peking University - Guanghua School of Management

Date Written: June 22, 2018


We study the effect of public information on collective decision-making in committees, where members can have both common and conflicting interests. In the presence of public information, the simple and efficient vote-your-signal strategy profile no longer constitutes an equilibrium under the commonly-used simultaneous voting rules, while the intuitive but inefficient follow-the-expert strategy profile almost always does. Although more information may be aggregated if agents are able to coordinate on more sophisticated equilibria, inefficiency can persist even in large elections if the provision of public information introduces general correlation between the signals observed by the agents. We propose simple voting procedures that can indirectly implement the outcomes of optimal ex post incentive compatible mechanisms with public information. The proposed voting procedures also have additional advantages when there is a concern for strategic disclosure of public information.

Keywords: Strategic voting, collective decision-making, public information, committee design, optimal voting rule, information disclosure

JEL Classification: D72, D82

Suggested Citation

Liu, Shuo, Voting with Public Information (June 22, 2018). University of Zurich, Department of Economics, Working Paper No. 191, Revised version, Available at SSRN: or

Shuo Liu (Contact Author)

Peking University - Guanghua School of Management ( email )

Peking University
Beijing, Beijing 100871

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Abstract Views
PlumX Metrics