How Falsifiable is the Collective Model? A New Test with an Application to Monogamous and Bigamous Households in Burkina Faso

36 Pages Posted: 4 May 2015

See all articles by Anyck Dauphin

Anyck Dauphin

Université du Quebec en Outaouais (UQO)

Bernard Fortin

Université Laval - Département d'Économique; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Guy Lacroix

Université Laval - Département d'Économique; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Abstract

Collective rationality is seldom if ever rejected in the literature, raising doubt about its falsifiability. We show that the standard approach to test the collective model with distribution factors may yield misleading inference. We generalize the model and provide an appropriate test procedure to assess its validity. Our new approach extends to households that include more than two decision-makers (e.g., polygamous households, adult children). We investigate household consumption decision-making within monogamous and bigamous households in Burkina Faso. Using the standard testing approach, collective rationality within monogamous households is not rejected. Using our proposed test procedure, collective rationality is however rejected for monogamous households. Furthermore, our test also rejects collective rationality for bigamous households. We conclude that the household efficiency does yield empirically falsifiable restrictions despite being scarcely rejected in the literature.

Keywords: collective model, distribution factors, rationality, efficiency, polygamy

JEL Classification: D1, D7, J12

Suggested Citation

Dauphin, Anyck and Fortin, Bernard and Lacroix, Guy, How Falsifiable is the Collective Model? A New Test with an Application to Monogamous and Bigamous Households in Burkina Faso. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2601688

Anyck Dauphin (Contact Author)

Université du Quebec en Outaouais (UQO) ( email )

Case postale 1250
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Bernard Fortin

Université Laval - Département d'Économique ( email )

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National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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IZA Institute of Labor Economics

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Guy Lacroix

Université Laval - Département d'Économique ( email )

2325 Rue de l'Université
Ste-Foy, Quebec G1K 7P4 G1K 7P4
Canada
418-656-2024 (Phone)
418-656-7798 (Fax)

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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