Contracting for Control of Landscape-Level Resources

43 Pages Posted: 4 May 2015

See all articles by Karen Bradshaw

Karen Bradshaw

Arizona State University (ASU) - Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law

Dean Lueck

Indiana University Bloomington - The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis; Indiana University

Date Written: May 3, 2015

Abstract

Environmental governance increasingly focuses on public-private partnerships. We focus on contracting as a subset of the role of private actors governing landscape-level resources — such as wildlife habitats, scenic vistas, and firescapes — that exceed individual parcel sizes and are thus difficult for individual landowners to control unilaterally. Numerous contractual arrangements have emerged to exert coordinated control over landscape-level resources. We hypothesize that variations in laws and transaction costs, which are controlled largely by the homogeneity of landowner preferences across fragmented parcels, drive private control of landscape-level resources. In the absence of effective private control, government agencies may assume control of the landscape-level resources. A series of case studies discusses how law shapes the conditions that favor private contracting regimes of landscape-level resources, which highlight broader themes of law as a catalyst for new governance.

Keywords: Law and Economics, Environmental Law, Natural Resources

Suggested Citation

Bradshaw, Karen and Lueck, Dean, Contracting for Control of Landscape-Level Resources (May 3, 2015). Iowa Law Review, Vol. 100, No. 101, 2015, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2602038 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2602038

Karen Bradshaw (Contact Author)

Arizona State University (ASU) - Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law ( email )

Farmer Building 440G PO Box 872011
Tempe, AZ 85287
United States

Dean Lueck

Indiana University Bloomington - The Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Political Theory & Policy Analysis ( email )

513 N. Park Avenue
Bloomington, IN 47408–3895
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://ostromworkshop.indiana.edu/people/directors/lueck-dean.html

Indiana University ( email )

107 S Indiana Ave
100 South Woodlawn
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://economics.indiana.edu/home/people/lueck/

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