Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties

31 Pages Posted: 15 Feb 2001

See all articles by Nuno Garoupa

Nuno Garoupa

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Fernando Gomez-Pomar

Universitat Pompeu Fabra

Date Written: December 2000

Abstract

Though clearly distinct in nature and procedure, both Regulatory Agencies and Courts frequently rely on similar instruments to sanction the same or very similar kinds of illegal behavior. In this paper, we develop a theory of the use of criminal sanctions in addition to regulatory penalties. We show that it is generally more effective to have a penalty imposed by a Regulatory Agency rather than by the Courts. We extend our analysis by considering imprisonment sentences, legal error, and collusion between a Regulatory Agency and an offender. The objective of the paper, though, is not limited to the determination of the theoretical conditions that can make the use of both sanctioning schemes optimal. Our analysis is also relevant to the application of a specific legal doctrine, the Double Jeopardy clause.

Suggested Citation

Garoupa, Nuno and Gomez-Pomar, Fernando, Punish Once or Punish Twice: A Theory of the Use of Criminal Sanctions in Addition to Regulatory Penalties (December 2000). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 308. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=260212 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.260212

Nuno Garoupa (Contact Author)

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Fernando Gomez-Pomar

Universitat Pompeu Fabra ( email )

Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27
08005 Barcelona
Spain
(34-93) 542 16 47 (Phone)
(34-93) 542 17 31 (Fax)

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