Corporate Environmental Performance and Lobbying

Academy of Management Discoveries, Forthcoming

38 Pages Posted: 8 May 2015 Last revised: 5 Jun 2015

See all articles by Magali A. Delmas

Magali A. Delmas

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)

Jinghui Lim

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)

Nicholas Nairn-Birch

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA)

Date Written: May 6, 2015

Abstract

In 2013, the energy and natural resources sector spent $359 million lobbying. Such spending is largely perceived as a strategy by industry to oppose regulation. Research has barely begun to investigate how firm-level performance on salient political issues affects corporate political strategy. In this paper, we address this issue in the context of the recent climate change policy debate in the United States. We hypothesize a U-shaped relationship between greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and lobbying expenditures. To test our hypothesis, our study leverages novel data on firm-level GHG emissions and lobbying expenses aimed specifically at climate change legislation. Our results based on 3,194 firm-observations during a 4 year-period, suggest that both dirty and clean firms are active in lobbying, which challenges the view of adversarial corporate strategy.

Suggested Citation

Delmas, Magali A. and Lim, Jinghui and Nairn-Birch, Nicholas, Corporate Environmental Performance and Lobbying (May 6, 2015). Academy of Management Discoveries, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2603359

Magali A. Delmas (Contact Author)

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) ( email )

405 Hilgard Avenue
Box 951361
Los Angeles, CA 90095
United States

Jinghui Lim

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) ( email )

405 Hilgard Avenue
Box 951361
Los Angeles, CA 90095
United States

Nicholas Nairn-Birch

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) ( email )

405 Hilgard Avenue
Box 951361
Los Angeles, CA 90095
United States

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