Should We Organize? Effects of Faculty Unionism on Academic Compensation

35 Pages Posted: 2 Jul 2004 Last revised: 30 Oct 2022

See all articles by Richard B. Freeman

Richard B. Freeman

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Edinburgh - School of Social and Political Studies; Harvard University; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

Date Written: November 1978

Abstract

This paper uses the American Association of University Professors surveys for the period 1965 to 1976 to examine the effect of faculty unionism on faculty pay. It compares estimated effects of unionism on compensation from cross-section regressions of faculty pay on union organization and from a longitudinal model designed to correct cross-section estimates for "unobserved characteristics" of schools that are correlated with unionism. The major findings are that: 1. unionism raises faculty pay but that the extent of the effect varies greatly by estimating model and time period covered; 2.the years a school has been organized has a stronger effect on pay than the standard 0-1 union dummy variable; 3. unionism raises the fringe benefit share of compensation; 4. the estimated coefficient on faculty unionism in cross-section regressions overstates the union impact because unionized schools tend to have been higher paying even before organization.

Suggested Citation

Freeman, Richard B., Should We Organize? Effects of Faculty Unionism on Academic Compensation (November 1978). NBER Working Paper No. w0301, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=260487

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