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The U.S. Listing Gap

55 Pages Posted: 13 May 2015 Last revised: 14 Jun 2016

Craig Doidge

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management

George Andrew Karolyi

Cornell University - Johnson Graduate School of Management

René M. Stulz

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 1, 2016

Abstract

Relative to other countries, the U.S. now has abnormally few listed firms. This “U.S. listing gap” is consistent with a decrease in the net benefit of a listing for U.S. firms. Since the listing peak in 1996, the propensity to be listed is lower for all firm size categories and industries, the new list rate is low, and the delist rate is high. The high delist rate accounts for 46% of the listing gap and the low new list rate for 54%. The high delist rate is explained by an unusually high rate of acquisitions of publicly listed firms.

Keywords: Stock market listing; New list; Delist

JEL Classification: G10; G15; G34

Suggested Citation

Doidge, Craig and Karolyi, George Andrew and Stulz, René M., The U.S. Listing Gap (June 1, 2016). Journal of Financial Economics (JFE), Forthcoming; Fisher College of Business Working Paper No. 2015-03-07; Charles A. Dice Center Working Paper No. 2015-07. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2605000

Craig Doidge

University of Toronto - Rotman School of Management ( email )

105 St. George Street
Toronto, Ontario M5S 3E6
Canada
416-946-8598 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.rotman.utoronto.ca/FacultyAndResearch/Faculty/FacultyBios/Doidge

George Andrew Karolyi

Cornell University - Johnson Graduate School of Management ( email )

Ithaca, NY 14853
United States

Rene M. Stulz (Contact Author)

Ohio State University (OSU) - Department of Finance ( email )

2100 Neil Avenue
Columbus, OH 43210-1144
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.cob.ohio-state.edu/fin/faculty/stulz

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

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