Implementability, Walrasian Equilibria and Efficient Matchings

10 Pages Posted: 12 May 2015 Last revised: 26 Oct 2016

See all articles by Piotr Dworczak

Piotr Dworczak

Northwestern University - Department of Economics

Anthony Lee Zhang

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business

Date Written: October 25, 2016

Abstract

In general screening problems, implementable allocation rules correspond exactly to Walrasian equilibria of an economy in which types are consumers with quasilinear utility and unit demand. Due to the welfare theorems, an allocation rule is implementable if and only if it induces an efficient matching between types and goods.

Keywords: Implementability, Walrasian Equilibrium, Multidimensional Screening

JEL Classification: D50, D82, D86

Suggested Citation

Dworczak, Piotr and Zhang, Anthony Lee, Implementability, Walrasian Equilibria and Efficient Matchings (October 25, 2016). Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 15-30, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2605306 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2605306

Piotr Dworczak (Contact Author)

Northwestern University - Department of Economics ( email )

2003 Sheridan Road
Evanston, IL 60208
United States

Anthony Lee Zhang

University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )

5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

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