The Equivalence of Political and Economic Allocations

Cardozo Electronic Law Bulletin, Accepted Papers Series, Vol. 26(1), 2015

10 Pages Posted: 14 May 2015  

P. G. Monateri

SciencesPo, Ecole de Droit; University of Turin - Faculty of Law

Date Written: May 13, 2015

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to analyse what does it happen when we introduce “violence”, threats and self-help, into economic models. This will be done considering the alternative between a market or a political allocation. The conclusions will be:

a) That under standard assumptions there is no difference between a market allocation and a political allocation; and so that there is no inner superiority in a market allocation in comparison with a political one.

b) That if we move away from these standard assumptions, then the only real economic problem becomes a “political” problem, and that there cannot be efficient conclusions which are independent from an initial allocation of force and resources.

Keywords: Law and Economics, Economic Allocation, Property Rights, Violence, Blackmail, Political, Coase, International Relations, Efficiency, Social Cost.

JEL Classification: A10, K00, K10, K40, L10

Suggested Citation

Monateri , P. G., The Equivalence of Political and Economic Allocations (May 13, 2015). Cardozo Electronic Law Bulletin, Accepted Papers Series, Vol. 26(1), 2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2605773

Pier Giuseppe Monateri (Contact Author)

SciencesPo, Ecole de Droit ( email )

13, Rue de l'Université
Paris
France

HOME PAGE: http://master.sciences-po.fr/droit/en

University of Turin - Faculty of Law ( email )

Via S. Ottavio 20
Torino, 10121
Italy
+39 11 59 14 12 (Phone)

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