Pushing the Prize Up. A Few Notes on Al-Qaeda's Reward Structure and the Choice of Casualties
Pushing the Prize up. A Few Notes on Al-Qaeda’s Reward Structure and the Choice of Casualties, “Crossroads”, IV, 2, 2004: 3-6.
4 Pages Posted: 21 May 2015
Date Written: October 21, 2004
The article aims at suggesting possible conjectures on Al-Qaeda's logic and structure. Even if the organization's secrecy makes any empirical evidence difficult to find, some insight can be provided by economic theory of contests: in this terms, Al-Qaeda can be acknowledged like an agent rewarding a prize (membership) to its clients (cells and would-be cells). Although this principle makes the organization hardly visible and virtually impenetrable, we contend that in the long term such a logic is non-sustainable.
Keywords: Al Qaeda, tournament, contest theory
JEL Classification: D74
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation