Globalization and the Design of International Institutions

In Governance in a Globalizing World (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. Donohue eds., Brookings 2000).

27 Pages Posted: 22 May 2015

See all articles by Cary Coglianese

Cary Coglianese

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School

Date Written: 2000

Abstract

In an increasingly globalized world, international rules and organizations have grown ever more crucial to the resolution of major economic and social concerns. How can leaders design international institutions that will effectively solve global regulatory problems? This paper confronts this question by presenting three major types of global problems, distinguishing six main categories of institutional forms that can be used to address these problems, and showing how the effectiveness of international institutions depends on achieving “form-problem” fit. Complicating that fit will be the tendency of nation states to prefer institutional forms that do little to constrain their sovereignty. Yet the least-constraining institutional forms are the very ones that will tend to be the least successful in dealing with global regulatory problems – especially commons problems and threats to human rights. Achieving effective form-problem fit therefore depends on creating institutional structures that can give nation-states adequate assurance that their interests will not be unduly undermined while simultaneously ensuring that global institutions enjoy sufficient independence for solving global problems.

Keywords: International regulation, institutional form, coordination, social norms, standards, treaties, non-state action, internal control, mutual recognition, consensual rules, delegation, withdrawal, free rider, collective action problems, harmonization, principal-agent, legitimacy

Suggested Citation

Coglianese, Cary, Globalization and the Design of International Institutions (2000). In Governance in a Globalizing World (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. Donohue eds., Brookings 2000)., Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2608946

Cary Coglianese (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-6867 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.upenn.edu/coglianese

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