Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby

Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, & Zoë Robinson eds., Oxford University Press, 2016)

Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2015-22

23 Pages Posted: 26 May 2015 Last revised: 18 Jan 2016

See all articles by Elizabeth Pollman

Elizabeth Pollman

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; Co-Director, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School - Institute for Law and Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute

Date Written: May 22, 2015

Abstract

Does a business corporation constitute a “person” that can “exercise religion” under the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993? In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Supreme Court answered this novel question in the affirmative, but this chapter shows that its anemic treatment of corporate law and theory provided little guidance on how to implement and limit the landmark ruling. This chapter critically examines the issues of corporate law and theory driving the Court’s analysis: (1) the theory of the corporation as a right holder; (2) corporate purpose; (3) the “closely held” category; and (4) state corporate law as a mechanism for resolving disputes about a corporation’s religious activity or purpose. Despite the weaknesses of the Hobby Lobby opinion, the decision nonetheless adds weight to the work of corporate law in ordering the rights of organizations and their social and religious roles, raising new questions for future exploration.

Keywords: Hobby Lobby, corporate rights, RFRA, corporate purpose, closely held, corporate personhood, corporate religious liberty, for-profit

JEL Classification: K22, L21, L32, L33

Suggested Citation

Pollman, Elizabeth, Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby (May 22, 2015). Corporate Law and Theory in Hobby Lobby, in The Rise of Corporate Religious Liberty (Micah Schwartzman, Chad Flanders, & Zoë Robinson eds., Oxford University Press, 2016), Loyola-LA Legal Studies Paper No. 2015-22, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2609585

Elizabeth Pollman (Contact Author)

University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School; Co-Director, University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School - Institute for Law and Economics; European Corporate Governance Institute ( email )

3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States

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