Balancing National Objectives and Settling Rivalries. Towards a New European Asylum System?

17 Pages Posted: 25 May 2015

See all articles by Enzo Rossi

Enzo Rossi

Rome University Tor Vergata, Department of Economics, Law and Institutions

Date Written: May 24, 2015

Abstract

We offer a holistic view (and formal representation) of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), in which the national objectives of the states emerge in terms of trade-off between control and respect of the asylum seekers' human rights. Control of access implies spillover of the flows towards neighbouring states and rivalries between the states in a non-cooperative game. An asylum system is a set of rules designed to settle rivalries, balancing out the national objectives. Thus, on the basis of a Pareto (unanimity) criterion, one system is preferred to another if all the states are better able to achieve their national objectives. We examine the conditions under which a relocation system based on quotas may be preferable to the Dublin rules, and the reasons why closer harmonisation of standards can favour adoption of such a system. Finally, we comment on the possible outcomes when unanimity is not achieved.

Keywords: European Union, European asylum policy, burden-sharing, asylum applications

JEL Classification: F22, Z13

Suggested Citation

Rossi, Enzo, Balancing National Objectives and Settling Rivalries. Towards a New European Asylum System? (May 24, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2609855 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2609855

Enzo Rossi (Contact Author)

Rome University Tor Vergata, Department of Economics, Law and Institutions ( email )

Via Columbia, 2
Rome, Rome 00133
Italy

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