A Hybrid Public Good Experiment Eliciting Multi-Dimensional Choice Data

34 Pages Posted: 28 May 2015

See all articles by Daniela Di Cagno

Daniela Di Cagno

LUISS, Rome

Arianna Galliera

Politecnico di Milano

Werner Güth

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; Luiss Guido Carli University

Luca Panaccione

University of Rome Tor Vergata

Date Written: May 28, 2015

Abstract

Similar to Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) we try to understand and explain the motivation of participants when contributing to a public good. In the Hybrid Public Good experiment each of two interacting contributors chooses an independent contribution level and three adjusted contribution levels when (s)he, as the only adjusting player, learns that the other's independent contribution is smaller, equal or larger than the own one. We systematically vary the probability that one player can adjust, based on such qualitative information, but maintain that no adaptation at all and adaptation by only one occurs with positive probability. Adaptation is framed in two ways, once by additively changing the own independent contribution and once by stating new contribution levels.

Surprisingly, there is a strong framing effect which increases with experience. Reacting to coinciding independent contributions implies impressive conformity in contributing. Reacting to higher, respectively lower independent contributions implies average upward, and, more strongly, downward adaptation.

Keywords: Public goods, experiments, voluntary contribution mechanism

JEL Classification: C91, C72, H41

Suggested Citation

Di Cagno, Daniela and Galliera, Arianna and Güth, Werner and Panaccione, Luca, A Hybrid Public Good Experiment Eliciting Multi-Dimensional Choice Data (May 28, 2015). CEIS Working Paper No. 343, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2611613 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2611613

Daniela Di Cagno

LUISS, Rome ( email )

00162 Rome, Roma
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.luiss.it/facolta/insegnamenti/curriculu

Arianna Galliera

Politecnico di Milano ( email )

Milan
Italy

Werner Güth

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

Luca Panaccione (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

via Columbia 2
Rome, IA Rome 00133
Italy

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