Amicus Brief of Scholars of Insurance Regulation in MetLife v. FSOC

28 Pages Posted: 30 May 2015

See all articles by Deepak Gupta

Deepak Gupta

Gupta/Beck

Daniel Schwarcz

University of Minnesota Law School

Date Written: May 22, 2015

Abstract

This Amicus Brief of Scholars of Insurance Regulation involves MetLife's challenge to the Financial Stability Oversight Council’s ("FSOC") determination that material financial distress at the company could pose a threat to U.S. financial stability. The brief focuses on one central element of MetLife’s challenge -- that FSOC failed to adequately consider the strength of the state insurance regulatory system in designating MetLife as a systemically significant nonbank financial company. The amicus brief argues that FSOC’s designation of MetLife fairly accounts for state insurance regulation’s focus on protecting policyholders rather than mitigating systemic risk. It argues that advancing these two regulatory goals often requires very different types of prudential safeguards and supervisory scrutiny. Many of the central features of U.S. state insurance regulation, the brief suggests, are inadequate in their capacity to prevent, anticipate, or respond to systemic risks. This problem is structural and cannot be remedied by state reforms, as states lack the inherent jurisdiction and ability to properly monitor and regulate systemic financial risk.

Keywords: State insurance regulation, systemic risk, MetLife, FSOC, SIFI

Suggested Citation

Gupta, Deepak and Schwarcz, Daniel B., Amicus Brief of Scholars of Insurance Regulation in MetLife v. FSOC (May 22, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2611853 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2611853

Deepak Gupta

Gupta/Beck ( email )

1625 Massachusetts Ave
Suite 500
Washington, DC 20036
United States

HOME PAGE: http://guptabeck.com/deepak-gupta/

Daniel B. Schwarcz (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota Law School ( email )

229 19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.umn.edu/profiles/daniel-schwarcz

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