Illegal Immigration and Fiscal Competition

48 Pages Posted: 1 Jun 2015

See all articles by Subhayu Bandyopadhyay

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - Research Division; IZA Institute of Labor Economics; West Virginia University

Santiago M. Pinto

Research Economist; West Virginia University - Department of Economics

Abstract

Reflecting recent enforcement policy activism of US states, this paper examines federal-state overlap of illegal immigration policy in a spatial context. Keeping the US-Mexico context in mind, we assume that labor from a source nation enters a host nation through bordering states. Once in the host, illegal immigrants may stay in the state of entry or move to another state. The host nation's federal government and/or the state governments choose border and internal enforcement policies, and also provide local goods. As a benchmark, we define the completely centralized solution as the case where the federal government chooses all the policies, while the state governments are passive. At higher levels of decentralization (i.e., as states take more responsibility in deciding some of the policies), the overlap of federal and state policies is associated with both vertical and horizontal externalities. Among other results, we find that if inter-state mobility is costless, internal enforcement is overprovided, and border enforcement and local goods are under-provided under decentralization, leading to relatively high levels of illegal immigration. While inter-state migration costs moderate such overprovision/under-provision, extreme levels of inter-state immobility may lead to too little illegal immigration, and an overprovision of local goods.

Keywords: illegal immigration, vertical and horizontal externalities, border and internal enforcement, publicly provided local goods

JEL Classification: F2, H4, H7

Suggested Citation

Bandyopadhyay, Subhayu and Pinto, Santiago M., Illegal Immigration and Fiscal Competition. IZA Discussion Paper No. 9061. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2612313

Subhayu Bandyopadhyay (Contact Author)

Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis - Research Division ( email )

411 Locust St
PO Box 442
St. Louis, MO 63011
United States

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

West Virginia University ( email )

Morgantown, WV 26506-6025
United States
304-293-7879 (Phone)
304-293-7061 (Fax)

Santiago M. Pinto

Research Economist ( email )

P.O. Box 27622
Richmond, VA 23261
United States

West Virginia University - Department of Economics ( email )

College of Business and Economics
1601 University Ave., Room #412
Morgantown, WV 26506-6025
United States
(304) 293-7871 (Phone)

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