31 Pages Posted: 2 Jun 2015 Last revised: 15 Dec 2015
Date Written: December 10, 2015
We consider extensive-form games in which players have the option to commit to actions before the game is played. We focus on commitment procedures where players make voluntary irreversible commitments in a prescribed order over the decision nodes. We study whether such commitment procedures may lead to Pareto-efficient outcomes. Our main positive result is surprisingly positive:For two-player games, we introduce an order over the decision nodes for which the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome is Pareto efficient regardless of the actual payoffs. We show an impossibility result for games with four players.
Keywords: Commitment Game, Extensive-form Games, Pareto Efficiency
JEL Classification: C72, D80
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Arieli, Itai and Babichenko, Yakov and Tennenholtz, Moshe, Sequential Commitment Games (December 10, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2613019 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2613019