Abstract

https://ssrn.com/abstract=2613360
 


 



Posthumous 'Punishment': What May Be Done About Criminal Wrongs After the Wrongdoer's Death?


Emmanuel Melissaris


London School of Economics - Law Department

June 2, 2015

LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 12/2015

Abstract:     
The commission of criminal wrongs is occasionally revealed after the (suspected) wrongdoer's death. In such cases, there seems to be a widely-shared intuition, which also frequently motivates many people's actions, that the dead should still be blamed and that some response, not only stemming from civil society but also the state, to the criminal wrong is necessary. This article explores the possibility of posthumous blame and punishment by the state. After highlighting the deficiencies of two pure versions of punishment theory, retributivism and general deterrence theory but also the potential in the latter, it argues for a political theory of the criminal law (mainly from a normative perspective, although the modest claim is made in passing that current institutional arrangements are best understood in this light), which views institutions of punishment as the business not only of defendants and victims but also the political community as a whole. Within this normative scheme posthumous responses to wrongs are possible and in some cases necessary for the maintenance of the stability of the political community. Accountability-holding processes may also be necessary for the protection of the reputation of the deceased suspected wrongdoer.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 22


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Date posted: June 4, 2015 ; Last revised: August 18, 2015

Suggested Citation

Melissaris, Emmanuel, Posthumous 'Punishment': What May Be Done About Criminal Wrongs After the Wrongdoer's Death? (June 2, 2015). LSE Legal Studies Working Paper No. 12/2015. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2613360 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2613360

Contact Information

Emmanuel Melissaris (Contact Author)
London School of Economics - Law Department ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

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