Belgian Federalism after the Sixth State Reform

Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 2015, 29-55

27 Pages Posted: 6 Jun 2015

See all articles by Jurgen Goossens

Jurgen Goossens

Ghent University - Law School; Erasmus University of Rotterdam, School of Law; Yale Law School

Pieter Cannoot

Ghent University-Universiteit Gent - Faculty of Law

Date Written: May 19, 2015

Abstract

This paper highlights the most important institutional evolutions of Belgian federalism stemming from the implementation of the sixth state reform (2012-2014). This reform inter alia included a transfer of powers worth 20 billion euros from the federal level to the level of the federated states, a profound reform of the Senate, and a substantial increase in fiscal autonomy for the regions. This contribution critically analyses the current state of Belgian federalism. Although the sixth state reform realized important and long-awaited changes, further evolutions are to be expected. Since the Belgian state model has reached its limits with regard to complexity and creativity, politicians and academics should begin to reflect on the seventh state reform with the aim of increasing the transparency of the current Belgian institutional labyrinth.

Keywords: Belgium, state reform, Senate, constitutional amendment procedure, fiscal autonomy, distribution of powers, Copernican revolution

Suggested Citation

Goossens, Jurgen and Cannoot, Pieter, Belgian Federalism after the Sixth State Reform (May 19, 2015). Perspectives on Federalism, Vol. 7, Issue 2, 2015, 29-55. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2614384

Jurgen Goossens (Contact Author)

Ghent University - Law School ( email )

Universiteitstraat 4
Ghent, B-9000
Belgium

Erasmus University of Rotterdam, School of Law ( email )

3000 DR Rotterdam
Netherlands

Yale Law School ( email )

127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06511
United States

Pieter Cannoot

Ghent University-Universiteit Gent - Faculty of Law ( email )

Universiteitstraat 4
Ghent, B-9000
Belgium

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