Strategy-Proof and Fair Assignment is Wasteful

11 Pages Posted: 8 Jun 2015

See all articles by Giorgio Martini

Giorgio Martini

Stanford Graduate School of Business

Date Written: June 6, 2015

Abstract

I prove that there exists no assignment mechanism that is strategy-proof, non-wasteful and satisfies equal treatment of equals. This strengthens the impossibility result of Bogomolnaia and Moulin (2001) by weakening their assumption of ordinal efficiency to non-wastefulness. My result solves an open question posed by Erdil (2014) and sheds some light on his results on the efficient frontier of random assignment mechanisms.

Keywords: random assignment, random serial dictatorship, strategy-proofness, ordinal efficiency, non-wastefulness

JEL Classification: C78, D47, D61

Suggested Citation

Martini, Giorgio, Strategy-Proof and Fair Assignment is Wasteful (June 6, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2615389 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2615389

Giorgio Martini (Contact Author)

Stanford Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States

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