DOJ Has the Power to Crush Price-Fixers: Column

USA Today Weekend, May 29-31, 2015, Page 11A.

University of Baltimore School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper

2 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2015

See all articles by Albert Foer

Albert Foer

American Antitrust Institute (AAI)

Douglas H. Ginsburg

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit; George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Robert H. Lande

University of Baltimore - School of Law

Joshua D. Wright

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty

Date Written: May 29-31, 2015

Abstract

The four of us are known in antitrust circles for the points on which we disagree. We do agree, however, that price fixing among competitors is inadequately deterred, is often profitable despite existing fines and damages actions, and that it's time to focus more on the individuals who participate in illegal cartels. We propose that, as part of its plea agreements, the Department of Justice should insist that corporate defendants agree not to hire or rehire anyone who has been convicted of price fixing. This re-employment often occurs today. In addition, the Department should insist that corporations agree not to pay the fines of their convicted employees, either directly or indirectly, or compensate them for serving time.

No new legislation would be needed to implement these measures, and there would be no significant budgetary consequences for taxpayers. These policies are logical extensions of a long-term bipartisan agreement on the necessity of tough anti-cartel enforcement, something that both conservatives and liberals support.

Keywords: price fixing, cartels, antitrust, collusion, antitrust penalties, antitrust sanctions, antitrust damages, antitrust fines, corporate fines, price fixing penalties

JEL Classification: K13, K14, K19, K21, K29, K39, K42, K49

Suggested Citation

Foer, Albert and Ginsburg, Douglas H. and Lande, Robert H. and Wright, Joshua D., DOJ Has the Power to Crush Price-Fixers: Column (May 29-31, 2015). USA Today Weekend, May 29-31, 2015, Page 11A. ; University of Baltimore School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2616775 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2616775

Albert Foer

American Antitrust Institute (AAI) ( email )

1730 Rhode Island Avenue, NW
Suite 1100
Washington, DC 20008-1022
United States

Douglas H. Ginsburg

U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit ( email )

333 Constitution Ave NW
Room 5523
Washington, DC 20001
United States

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

Robert H. Lande (Contact Author)

University of Baltimore - School of Law ( email )

1420 N. Charles Street
Baltimore, MD 21218
United States

Joshua D. Wright

George Mason University - Antonin Scalia Law School, Faculty ( email )

3301 Fairfax Drive
Arlington, VA 22201
United States

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