Does Reference Pricing Drive Out Generic Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets? Evidence from a Policy Reform.

44 Pages Posted: 12 Jun 2015

See all articles by Kurt Richard Brekke

Kurt Richard Brekke

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Chiara Canta

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Economics

Odd Rune Straume

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); University of Minho - Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 4, 2015

Abstract

In this paper we study the impact of reference pricing (RP) on entry of generic firms in the pharmaceutical market. For given prices, RP increases generic firms' expected profit, but since RP also stimulates price competition, the impact on generic entry is theoretically ambiguous. In order to empirically test the effects of RP, we exploit a policy reform in Norway in 2005 that exposed a subset of drugs to RP. Having detailed product-level data for a wide set of substances from 2003 to 2013, we find that RP increased the number of generic drugs. We also find that RP increased market shares of generic drugs, reduced the prices of both branded and generic drugs, and led to a (weakly significant) decrease in total drug expenditures. The reduction in total expenditures was relatively smaller than the reduction in average prices, reflecting the fact that lower prices stimulated total demand.

Keywords: Pharmaceuticals; Reference pricing; Generic entry

JEL Classification: I11; I18; L13; L65

Suggested Citation

Brekke, Kurt Richard and Canta, Chiara and Straume, Odd Rune and Straume, Odd Rune, Does Reference Pricing Drive Out Generic Competition in Pharmaceutical Markets? Evidence from a Policy Reform. (June 4, 2015). NHH Dept. of Economics Discussion Paper No. 11/2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2617267 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2617267

Kurt Richard Brekke (Contact Author)

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Chiara Canta

NHH Norwegian School of Economics - Department of Economics ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway

Odd Rune Straume

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

University of Minho - Economic Policies Research Unit (NIPE) ( email )

Campus de Gualtar
Braga, 4710-057
Portugal

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