Experience and Gender Effects in an Acquiring-a-Company Experiment Allowing for Value Messages

40 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2015

See all articles by Daniela Di Cagno

Daniela Di Cagno

LUISS, Rome

Arianna Galliera

Politecnico di Milano

Werner Güth

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods; Luiss Guido Carli University

Noemi Pace

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics

Luca Panaccione

University of Rome Tor Vergata

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: June 15, 2015

Abstract

This paper focuses on a bargaining experiment in which the privately informed seller of a company sends a value message to the uninformed potential buyer who then proposes a price for acquiring the company. Participants are constantly in the role of either seller or buyer and interact over 30 rounds with randomly changing partners in the other role. We test how overstating the value of the company, underpricing the received value message and acceptance of price offers are affected by experience and gender (constellation). Like in our companion paper on single play (Di Cagno et al. 2015) we control via treatments for awareness of gender (constellation). One main hypothesis is that gender (constellation) matters but that the effects become weaker with more experience and that the main experience effects apply across gender (constellations).

Keywords: bargaining, cheap-talk, experience effect, experiment, gender, winner’s curse

JEL Classification: C78; C91

Suggested Citation

Di Cagno, Daniela and Galliera, Arianna and Güth, Werner and Pace, Noemi and Panaccione, Luca, Experience and Gender Effects in an Acquiring-a-Company Experiment Allowing for Value Messages (June 15, 2015). CEIS Working Paper No. 346, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2618399 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2618399

Daniela Di Cagno

LUISS, Rome ( email )

00162 Rome, Roma
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.luiss.it/facolta/insegnamenti/curriculu

Arianna Galliera

Politecnico di Milano ( email )

Milan
Italy

Werner Güth

Max Planck Society for the Advancement of the Sciences - Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods

Kurt-Schumacher-Str. 10
D-53113 Bonn, 53113
Germany

Luiss Guido Carli University ( email )

Via O. Tommasini 1
Rome, Roma 00100
Italy

Noemi Pace

Ca Foscari University of Venice - Department of Economics ( email )

Cannaregio 873
Venice, 30121
Italy

Luca Panaccione (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

via Columbia 2
Rome, IA Rome 00133
Italy

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