Landownership Concentration and the Expansion of Education

55 Pages Posted: 16 Jun 2015 Last revised: 18 Feb 2016

See all articles by Francesco Cinnirella

Francesco Cinnirella

University of Bergamo; University of Southern Denmark - Department of Business and Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CAGE

Erik Hornung

University of Cologne - Center for Macroeconomic Research (CMR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

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Date Written: December 23, 2015

Abstract

We study the relationship between large landownership concentration and the expansion of mass education in nineteenth-century Prussia. Cross-sectional estimates show a negative association between landownership concentration and enrollment rates. Fixed-effects panel estimates indicate that regions with an initially stronger landownership concentration exhibit increasing enrollment rates. This relationship is not driven by differences in the supply of schooling. We argue that the implementation of agricultural reforms including the stepwise abolition of serfdom is an important driver of the change in enrollment. The results are consistent with the interpretation that emancipation from labor coercion increased the private demand for education.

Keywords: Land concentration, Education, Serfdom, Peasants' emancipation, Prussian economic history

JEL Classification: O43, Q15, I25, N33

Suggested Citation

Cinnirella, Francesco and Hornung, Erik, Landownership Concentration and the Expansion of Education (December 23, 2015). Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax Law and Public Finance No. 2015-2. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2618478

Francesco Cinnirella

University of Bergamo ( email )

Via dei Caniana 2
Bergamo, 24129
Italy

University of Southern Denmark - Department of Business and Economics ( email )

DK-5230 Odense
Denmark

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) - Ifo Institute ( email )

Poschingerstrasse 5
Munich, 81679
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

CAGE ( email )

Premier Business Centre
47-49 Park Royal Road
London, NW10 7LQ
United Kingdom

Erik Hornung (Contact Author)

University of Cologne - Center for Macroeconomic Research (CMR) ( email )

Cologne
Germany

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute) ( email )

Munich
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) ( email )

London
United Kingdom

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