Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is it Effective, and, If so, How Does it Work?

43 Pages Posted: 28 Feb 2001

See all articles by Mark P. Taylor

Mark P. Taylor

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Brookings Institution

Lucio Sarno

University of Cambridge - Judge Business School; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Date Written: February 2001

Abstract

In this Paper we assess the progress made by the profession in understanding whether and how exchange rate intervention works. To this end, we review the theory and evidence on official intervention, concentrating primarily on work published within the last decade or so. Our reading of the recent literature leads us to conclude that, in contrast with the profession's consensus view of the 1980s, official intervention can be effective, especially through its role as a signal of policy intentions, and especially when it is publicly announced and concerted. We also note, however, an apparent empirical puzzle concerning the secrecy of much intervention and suggest an additional way in which intervention may be effective but which has so far received little attention in the literature, namely through its role in remedying a coordination failure in the foreign exchange market.

Keywords: Non-Linear Dynamics, Purchasing Power Parity, Real Exchange Rate, Test Power, Unit Root Test

JEL Classification: C10, F31, F41

Suggested Citation

Taylor, Mark P. and Sarno, Lucio, Official Intervention in the Foreign Exchange Market: Is it Effective, and, If so, How Does it Work? (February 2001). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=261856

Mark P. Taylor

Washington University in St. Louis - John M. Olin Business School ( email )

One Brookings Drive
Campus Box 1156
St. Louis, MO 63130-4899
United States

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Brookings Institution ( email )

1775 Massachusetts Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States

Lucio Sarno (Contact Author)

University of Cambridge - Judge Business School ( email )

Trumpington Street
Cambridge, CB2 1AG
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

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