Legal Moralism and Public Wrongs

Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Truths: The Philosophy of Michael S Moore, K. K. Ferzan & S. Morse (eds), Oxford University Press, Forthcoming

Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-17

15 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2015

See all articles by R. A. Duff

R. A. Duff

University of Stirling - Department of Philosophy

Date Written: June 15, 2015

Abstract

After sketching the main features of Moore’s version of legal moralism, and its connection to the type of retributivism that he espouses, I note its expansiveness, both as to the kinds of wrong and as to the range of agents that we have in principle reason to criminalise. I argue that we should instead ground a more modest legal moralism in the traditional idea of crimes as public wrongs and (in response to Moore’s criticisms of that idea) that we can begin to give it substantial content by beginning with the idea of the public realm that any polity must determine for itself; the way in which codes of professional ethics are developed on the basis of an account of the proper scope of the profession provides a useful illustration of this method.

Keywords: Criminal law, legal moralism, retributivism, public wrongs, professional ethics

Suggested Citation

Duff, Robin Antony, Legal Moralism and Public Wrongs (June 15, 2015). Legal, Moral, and Metaphysical Truths: The Philosophy of Michael S Moore, K. K. Ferzan & S. Morse (eds), Oxford University Press, Forthcoming, Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper No. 15-17, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2618677 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2618677

Robin Antony Duff (Contact Author)

University of Stirling - Department of Philosophy ( email )

Stirling, Scotland FK9 4LA
United Kingdom

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
320
Abstract Views
1,530
rank
108,693
PlumX Metrics