Motivated Brokers

39 Pages Posted: 19 Jun 2015 Last revised: 4 Oct 2018

See all articles by Tesalia Rizzo

Tesalia Rizzo

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, Department of Political Science

Date Written: May 27, 2015

Abstract

I use data from in-depth interviews with party leaders and political brokers during the electoral off-season to show that brokers are not only motivated by electoral payoffs. Brokers also procure their clients esteem across electoral cycles to secure their positions. I argue that motivation to maximize electoral return during elections differs from the one to maximize their tenure during the electoral off-season. While the first requires strategic distribution according to electoral preferences, the second requires brokers to procure esteem and trust within their communities. Both are important, however, understanding motivations across the electoral cycle is key in understanding the influence it exerts on distributive outcomes and welfare as well as potential avenues for informal accountability between clients and brokers.

Keywords: political parties, brokers, clientelism, intermediaries

Suggested Citation

Rizzo, Tesalia, Motivated Brokers (May 27, 2015). MIT Political Science Department Research Paper No. 2015-16. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2619843 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2619843

Tesalia Rizzo (Contact Author)

Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), School of Humanities, Arts, and Social Sciences, Department of Political Science ( email )

77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
United States

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