A Case of Evolutionarily Stable Attainable Equilibrium in the Lab

43 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2015 Last revised: 15 Aug 2019

See all articles by Christoph Kuzmics

Christoph Kuzmics

University of Graz - Department of Economics

Daniel Rodenburger

University of Jena

Date Written: August 9, 2019

Abstract

We reinvestigate data from the voting experiment of Forsythe, Myerson, Rietz, and Weber (1993). In every one of 24 rounds 28 players were randomly (re)allocated into two groups of 14 to play a voting stage game with or without a preceding opinion poll phase. We find that the null hypothesis that play in every round is given by a particular evolutionarily stable attainable equilibrium of the 14 player stage game cannot be rejected if we account for risk-aversion (or a heightened concern for coordination), calibrated in another treatment.

Keywords: opinion polls, elections, testing, Nash equilibrium, attainable equilibrium, evolutionary stability

JEL Classification: C57, C72, D72

Suggested Citation

Kuzmics, Christoph and Rodenburger, Daniel, A Case of Evolutionarily Stable Attainable Equilibrium in the Lab (August 9, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2620940 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2620940

Christoph Kuzmics (Contact Author)

University of Graz - Department of Economics ( email )

Universitaetsstrasse 15
RESOWI - F4
Graz, 8010
Austria

Daniel Rodenburger

University of Jena ( email )

Furstengraben 1
Jena, Thuringa 07743
Germany

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