Disentangling Liberalization and Privatization Policies: Is There a Political Trade-Off?

19 Pages Posted: 20 Jun 2015

See all articles by Filippo Belloc

Filippo Belloc

University of Siena - Department of Economics and Statistics

Antonio Nicita

University of Siena - Department of Economics

Simone M. Sepe

University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law; University of Toulouse 1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole; IAST - Fondation Jean-Jacques Laffont - TSE; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: 2014

Abstract

We empirically investigate the political determinants of liberalization and privatization policies in six network industries of 30 OECD countries. We unbundle liberalization and privatization reforms and study their simultaneous determination in a two-equation model. Our findings unveil that both right-wing and left-wing governments implement liberalizations and privatizations, showing a common trend under the so-called neo-liberalism wave. However, although the privatization rate is higher than liberalization in right-wing environments, the opposite occurs under left-wing governments. We conclude that different deregulation patterns should be expected under governments characterized by different political ideologies.

Keywords: Liberalization, Privatization, Network industries, Partisanship

JEL Classification: D72, L50, P16, C33

Suggested Citation

Belloc, Filippo and Nicita, Antonio and Sepe, Simone M., Disentangling Liberalization and Privatization Policies: Is There a Political Trade-Off? (2014). Journal of Comparative Economics, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2014. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2621009

Filippo Belloc (Contact Author)

University of Siena - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Piazza San Francesco 7
Siena, Siena 53100
Italy

Antonio Nicita

University of Siena - Department of Economics ( email )

Piazza S. Francesco, 7
Siena, I-53100
Italy

Simone M. Sepe

University of Arizona - James E. Rogers College of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 210176
Tucson, AZ 85721-0176
United States

University of Toulouse 1 - Université Toulouse 1 Capitole ( email )

2 Rue du Doyen-Gabriel-Marty
Toulouse, 31042
France

IAST - Fondation Jean-Jacques Laffont - TSE ( email )

21 allée de Brienne
31015 Toulouse Cedex 6
Toulouse Cedex, F-31042
France

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

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