Paul Davidson, the Post Keynesians, and the Inductive Fallacy of Conditional A Priorism (Long Runism) - Why the Ergodic-Non Ergodic Distinction is Meaningless and Erroneous for ALL Decision Makers
11 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2015 Last revised: 15 Aug 2015
Date Written: June 21, 2015
Paul Davidson and his Post Keynesian-Institutionalist supporters have erred egregiously in basing their Ergodic-Non Ergodic theory of uncertainty and risk on the inductive fallacy of Conditional A priorism (Long Runism). The claim, made by Paul Davidson and his Post Keynesian-Institutionalist supporters for over 30 years, that decision makers are able to identify the ergodicity or non ergodicity of long run stochastic sequences or series of events or outcomes in the short run, based on Davidson’s claim that decision makers are able to know or learn of the convergence properties of such series or sequences, which can only be known "in the long run" (infinity), by examining sub series or sub sequences, is patently false and not accepted by any scholar in any other academic field except Post Keynesianism. Davidson bases his claims to knowledge on both metaphysical speculations and/or a priori claims to knowledge that are stronger than any claim ever made by any neoclassical economist.
Keywords: conditional a priorism, long runism, N. Rescher, metaphysical speculation
JEL Classification: B10, B12, B20, B22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation