Sources of Franco-German Corporate Support for the Euro: The Effects of Business Network Centrality and Political Connections

European Union Politics 14.1 (2013): 115-139

37 Pages Posted: 21 Jun 2015

See all articles by Kai Jäger

Kai Jäger

King’s College London - Department of Political Economy

Date Written: June 20, 2015

Abstract

During the Euro crisis of June 2011, 51 representatives of major French and German corporations launched a political campaign in support of the Euro. This study shows that firm size facilitated high-quality business contacts but that variables of economic interest were not associated with a higher probability of campaign participation when controlling for relational variables. Instead, the empirical analysis suggests that Franco-German business-leaders joined the campaign because 1) their central network position provided them with informational resources to transcend the interest of their firm, and 2) their social and political embeddedness either led to an internalization of pro-Euro values or gave them an incentive to improve their long-term reputation with political decision makers who strongly support the Euro as part of the European integration project. Thus, the directors’ corporate and political ties facilitated and motivated corporate political action in support of the Euro.

Keywords: Corporate political behavior, euro crisis, European Monetary Union, lobbying, political campaign, political connections, social and political embeddedness, social network analysis

Suggested Citation

Jäger, Kai, Sources of Franco-German Corporate Support for the Euro: The Effects of Business Network Centrality and Political Connections (June 20, 2015). European Union Politics 14.1 (2013): 115-139, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2621109 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2621109

Kai Jäger (Contact Author)

King’s College London - Department of Political Economy ( email )

Strand Building
London
United Kingdom

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