Close Competitors in Merger Review

Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2013, p. 391 - 401

24 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2015 Last revised: 23 Jun 2015

Stefan Thomas

University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law

Date Written: July 25, 2013

Abstract

The analysis of unilateral effects in horizontal mergers — especially on markets for differentiated goods — can take into consideration the extent to which the merging firms are close competitors. The elimination of a close competitor can result in an upward pricing pressure (UPP) on the merged firm which can harm consumers. Although a quantitative UPP analysis is an important enhancement of substantive merger appraisal, it should not be considered sufficient in itself for the finding of a significant impediment to effective competition in terms of Article 2 of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). Rather, market definition and the analysis of the market structure including market shares should generally constitute the backbone of any theory of harm.

Keywords: antitrust, mergers, unilateral effects, market definition, market dominance, relevant market, upward pricing pressure

JEL Classification: K21, L13, L4, L40

Suggested Citation

Thomas, Stefan, Close Competitors in Merger Review (July 25, 2013). Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2013, p. 391 - 401. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2621141

Stefan Thomas (Contact Author)

University of Tuebingen - Faculty of Law ( email )

Geschwister Scholl Platz
Tuebingen, 72074
Germany
0049-7071-29-72556 (Phone)
0049-7071-29-2105 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.jura.uni-tuebingen.de/professoren_und_dozenten/thomas

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