Close Competitors in Merger Review
Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, 2013, p. 391 - 401
24 Pages Posted: 22 Jun 2015 Last revised: 23 Jun 2015
Date Written: July 25, 2013
The analysis of unilateral effects in horizontal mergers — especially on markets for differentiated goods — can take into consideration the extent to which the merging firms are close competitors. The elimination of a close competitor can result in an upward pricing pressure (UPP) on the merged firm which can harm consumers. Although a quantitative UPP analysis is an important enhancement of substantive merger appraisal, it should not be considered sufficient in itself for the finding of a significant impediment to effective competition in terms of Article 2 of the EU Merger Regulation (EUMR). Rather, market definition and the analysis of the market structure including market shares should generally constitute the backbone of any theory of harm.
Keywords: antitrust, mergers, unilateral effects, market definition, market dominance, relevant market, upward pricing pressure
JEL Classification: K21, L13, L4, L40
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation