Community Managed Forest Groups and Preferences for REDD Contract Attributes: A Choice Experiment Survey of Communities in Nepal

43 Pages Posted: 20 Apr 2016

See all articles by Sahan Dissanayake

Sahan Dissanayake

Colby College - Department of Economics

Prakash Jha

Ca Foscari University of Venice

Bhim Adhikari

International Development Research Centre (IDRC)

Rajesh Bista

ForestAction Nepal

Randall A. Bluffstone

Portland State University - Department of Economics

Harisharan Luintel

ForestAction; Portland State University

Peter Martinsson

Göteborg University - Department of Economics and Statistics

Naya S. Paudel

ForestAction

Eswaran Somanathan

Indian Statistical Institute

Michael Toman

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG)

Date Written: June 22, 2015

Abstract

A significant portion of the world?s forests that are eligible for Reducing Emission from Deforestation and Forest Degradation, known as REDD , payments are community managed forests. However, there is little knowledge about preferences of households living in community managed forests for REDD contracts, or the opportunity costs of accepting REDD contracts for these communities. This paper uses a choice experiment survey of rural communities in Nepal to understand respondents? preferences toward the institutional structure of REDD contracts. The sample is split across communities with community managed forests groups and those without community managed forest groups to see how prior involvement in community managed forest groups affects preferences. The results show that respondents care about how the payments are divided between households and communities, the severity of restrictions on firewood use, the restrictions on grazing, and the fairness of access to community managed forest resources as well as the level of payments. The preferences for REDD contracts are in general similar between community managed and non-community managed forest resource respondents, but there are differences, in particular with regard to how beliefs influence the likelihood of accepting the contracts. Finally, the paper finds that the opportunity cost of REDD payments, although cheaper than many other carbon dioxide abatement options, is higher than previously suggested in the literature.

Keywords: Science of Climate Change, Global Environment, Inequality, Climate Change and Health, Climate Change and Environment

Suggested Citation

Dissanayake, Sahan and Jha, Prakash and Adhikari, Bhim and Bista, Rajesh and Bluffstone, Randall Ames and Luintel, Harisharan and Martinsson, Peter and Paudel, Naya S. and Somanathan, E. and Toman, Michael, Community Managed Forest Groups and Preferences for REDD Contract Attributes: A Choice Experiment Survey of Communities in Nepal (June 22, 2015). World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 7326. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2621880

Sahan Dissanayake (Contact Author)

Colby College - Department of Economics ( email )

Waterville, ME 04901
United States

Prakash Jha

Ca Foscari University of Venice

Dorsoduro 3246
Venice, Veneto 30123
Italy

Bhim Adhikari

International Development Research Centre (IDRC)

Canada

Rajesh Bista

ForestAction Nepal ( email )

Satdobato
Kathmandu
Nepal

Randall Ames Bluffstone

Portland State University - Department of Economics ( email )

P.O. Box 751
Portland, OR 97207-0751
United States
503-725-3938 (Phone)
503-725-3945 (Fax)

Harisharan Luintel

ForestAction

PO Box: 12207
Lalitpur
Nepal

Portland State University

PO Box 751
Portland, OR 97207
United States

Peter Martinsson

Göteborg University - Department of Economics and Statistics ( email )

Box 640
Vasagatan 1, E-building, floor 5 & 6
Göteborg, 40530
Sweden

Naya S. Paudel

ForestAction ( email )

PO Box: 12207
Lalitpur
Nepal

E. Somanathan

Indian Statistical Institute ( email )

7 S. J. S. Sansanwal Marg
New Delhi, 110016
India

Michael Toman

World Bank - Development Research Group (DECRG) ( email )

1818 H. Street N.W.
MSN3-311
Washington, DC 20433
United States

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