The Need for More Efficient Public Funding of New Communications Infrastructure in EU Member States

34 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2015

See all articles by Wolfgang Briglauer

Wolfgang Briglauer

WU Vienna

Christian Holzleitner

European Union - Directorate General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA)

Ingo Vogelsang

Boston University - Department of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Date Written: June 22, 2015

Abstract

A broad-scale coverage of new high-speed broadband networks as foreseen by the European Commission still appears to be a rather unrealistic objective in most EU member states without government intervention in terms of funding network deployment in unprofitable areas. We contend, however, that the current contract practice of fixing ex ante targets for network expansion is inefficient given the uncertainty about future returns on high-speed broadband services and the public authorities’ incomplete information about the costs of the network provider. This paper puts forward to delegate the choice of the network expansion to the typically much better informed network operator. Furthermore, we show that such contracts can be implemented based on existing accounting data and that it is not necessary to undertake any ex post verification of cost or demand data as is currently the case under claw-back rules.

Keywords: Contract theory, public utilities, next generation telecommunications networks, subsidies

JEL Classification: H20, L43, L44, L51, L52, L96

Suggested Citation

Briglauer, Wolfgang and Holzleitner, Christian and Vogelsang, Ingo, The Need for More Efficient Public Funding of New Communications Infrastructure in EU Member States (June 22, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2621902 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2621902

Wolfgang Briglauer (Contact Author)

WU Vienna ( email )

Welthandelsplatz 1 1
Wien, 1020
Austria

Christian Holzleitner

European Union - Directorate General for Climate Action (DG CLIMA) ( email )

Rue de la Loi 200
Brussels, B-1049
Belgium

Ingo Vogelsang

Boston University - Department of Economics ( email )

270 Bay State Road
Boston, MA 02215
United States

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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