Constitutions and Social Networks

42 Pages Posted: 23 Jun 2015

See all articles by Ana Mauleon

Ana Mauleon

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL)

Nils Roehl

University of Paderborn

Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE)

Date Written: June 23, 2015

Abstract

The objective of the paper is to analyze the formation of social networks where individuals are allowed to engage in several groups at the same time. These group structures are interpreted here as social networks. Each group is supposed to have specific rules or constitutions governing which members may join or leave it. Given these constitutions, we consider a social network to be stable if no group is modified any more. We provide requirements on constitutions and players’ preferences under which stable social networks are induced for sure. Furthermore, by embedding many-to-many matchings into our setting, we apply our model to job markets with labor unions. To some extent the unions may provide job guarantees and, therefore, have influence on the stability of the job market.

Keywords: Social Networks, Constitutions, Stability, Many-to-Many Matchings

JEL Classification: C72, C78, D85

Suggested Citation

Mauleon, Ana and Roehl, Nils and Vannetelbosch, Vincent J., Constitutions and Social Networks (June 23, 2015). FEEM Working Paper No. 059.2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2621959 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2621959

Ana Mauleon (Contact Author)

Catholic University of Louvain (UCL)

Place Montesquieu, 3
Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium

Nils Roehl

University of Paderborn ( email )

Warburger Str. 100
Paderborn, D-33098
Germany

Vincent J. Vannetelbosch

Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE) ( email )

34 Voie du Roman Pays
1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, 1348
Belgium

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