Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games
32 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2015 Last revised: 25 Jun 2015
Date Written: June 25, 2015
We introduce the model of Stochastic Revision Games where a finite set of players control a state variable and receive payoffs as a function of the state at a terminal deadline. There is a Poisson clock which dictates when players are called to choose of revise their actions. This paper studies the existence of Markov perfect equilibria in those games. We give an existence proof assuming some form of correlation.
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Lovo, Stefano and Tomala, Tristan, Markov Perfect Equilibria in Stochastic Revision Games (June 25, 2015). HEC Paris Research Paper No. ECO/SCD-2015-1093, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2622084 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2622084
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