The Rise and Fall of the Great Fish Pact Under Endogenous Risk of Stock Collapse

37 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2015

See all articles by Adam Walker

Adam Walker

Wageningen UR - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group

Hans-Peter Weikard

Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences

Andries Richter

University of Oslo

Date Written: June 24, 2015

Abstract

Risk of stock collapse is a genuine motivation for cooperative fisheries management. We analyse the effect of an endogenously determined risk of stock collapse on the incentives to cooperate in a Great Fish War model. We establish that equilibrium harvest strategies are non-linear in stock and find that Grand Coalitions can be stable for any number of players if free-riding results in a total depletion of the fish stock. The results thus show conditions under which a Great Fish War becomes a Great Fish Pact. However, this conclusion no longer holds upon dropping the standard assumption that payoffs are evaluated in steady states. If payoffs in the transition between steady states are included, the increased incentives to deviate offset the increased benefits from cooperation due to the presence of endogenous risk and the Great Fish Pact returns to being a Great Fish War.

Keywords: Coalition Stability, Dynamic Games, Endogenous Risk, Fish Stock Collapse, Fish War, Renewable Resource Exploitation

JEL Classification: C72, C73, Q22

Suggested Citation

Walker, Adam and Weikard, Hans-Peter and Richter, Andries, The Rise and Fall of the Great Fish Pact Under Endogenous Risk of Stock Collapse (June 24, 2015). FEEM Working Paper No. 060.2015, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2622409 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2622409

Adam Walker (Contact Author)

Wageningen UR - Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group ( email )

P.O. Box 8130
Wageningen, 6700 EW
Netherlands

Hans-Peter Weikard

Wageningen UR - School of Social Sciences ( email )

De Leeuwenborch
Hollandseweg 1
6706 KN Wageningen
Netherlands
+31 317 48 24 94 (Phone)
+31 317 48 49 33 (Fax)

Andries Richter

University of Oslo ( email )

PO Box 6706 St Olavs plass
Oslo, N-0317
Norway

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
37
Abstract Views
454
PlumX Metrics