Stability and the Immediate Acceptance Rule When School Priorities are Weak

34 Pages Posted: 29 Jun 2015 Last revised: 26 Apr 2016

See all articles by Wonki Jo Cho

Wonki Jo Cho

Korea University

Battal Doğan

Department of Economics, University of Bristol

Date Written: April 20, 2016

Abstract

In a model of school choice, we allow school priorities to be weak and study the preference revelation game induced by the immediate acceptance (IA) rule (also known as the Boston rule), or the IA game. When school priorities can be weak and matches probabilistic, three stability notions - ex post stability, ex ante stability, and strong ex ante stability - and two ordinal equilibrium notions - sd equilibrium and strong sd equilibrium - become available ("sd" stands for stochastic dominance). We show that for no combination of stability and equilibrium notions does the set of stable matches coincide with the set of equilibrium matches of the IA game. This stands in contrast with the existing result that the two sets are equal when priorities are strict. We also show that in the presence of weak priorities, the transition from the IA rule to the deferred acceptance rule may, in fact, harm some students.

Keywords: school choice, stability, immediate acceptance rule

JEL Classification: C78, D71, D78

Suggested Citation

Cho, Wonki Jo and Doğan, Battal, Stability and the Immediate Acceptance Rule When School Priorities are Weak (April 20, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2622454 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2622454

Wonki Jo Cho

Korea University ( email )

Anam-ro 145
Seongbuk-gu
Seoul, Seoul 02841
Korea, Republic of (South Korea)

Battal Doğan (Contact Author)

Department of Economics, University of Bristol ( email )

United Kingdom

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