Director Overconfidence

58 Pages Posted: 27 Jun 2015 Last revised: 19 Feb 2019

See all articles by Randy Beavers

Randy Beavers

Seattle Pacific University; University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies

Shawn Mobbs

University of Alabama - Culverhouse College of Business Administration

Date Written: December 3, 2018

Abstract

We examine overconfident CEO directors and find they attend more board meetings, are more likely to serve on the nominating or the compensation committee, have more independent directorships, and foster higher attendance rates on boards. Boards with overconfident directors are more likely to appoint a better prepared and more reputable CEO following a turnover. These newly appointed CEOs are also more likely to be overconfident. This evidence indicates overconfident CEO directors exhibit significant influence on the board and over the firm’s CEO selection.

Keywords: overconfidence, CEO-director, CEO turnover, committee participation

JEL Classification: G30, M51, M52

Suggested Citation

Beavers, Randy and Mobbs, Shawn, Director Overconfidence (December 3, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2622739 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2622739

Randy Beavers (Contact Author)

Seattle Pacific University ( email )

3307 Third Avenue West
Seattle, WA 98119-1997
United States
2062813523 (Phone)

University of Alabama - Department of Economics, Finance and Legal Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 870244
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

Shawn Mobbs

University of Alabama - Culverhouse College of Business Administration ( email )

101 Paul W. Bryant Dr.
Box 870382
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
189
Abstract Views
930
rank
160,210
PlumX Metrics